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I
In the introductory remarks to his 1934–5 lecture series on Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s late hymns “Germanien” and “Der Rhein,” the first he gave 
on Hölderlin’s poetry, Heidegger discusses the “form” of the opening 
lines from “Germanien”: 
The form of the poem provides no particular di)cul-
ties. The meter does not follow the model of any con-
ventional genre. A poem without meter and rhyme is 
nevertheless not really a poem at all, not poetry, prose 
rather. […] and yet, [a] common, precise, prosaic “for” 
[denn], sounds, as though spoken for the first time, and 
this apparent prose of the whole poem is more poetic 
than the smoothest gambolling lines and jingling 
rhymes of any Goethesque Lieder or other singsong. 
(GA 39: 16)
What is at stake when Heidegger says that this word denn “sounds, as 
though spoken for the first time”? Firstly, it has an impact for how we 
understand Heidegger’s relation to poetry, and to what he scathingly 
calls “literary history and aesthetics.” The word’s “sounding” is in an-
tagonism with the generic requirements of meter and rhyme; yet meter 
and rhyme are not therefore irrelevant to what Heidegger is trying to 
describe, since it is precisely in rejecting meter and rhyme from within 
verse that this word comes to “sound.” The “apparent prose” through 
which this word “sounds” is only “apparent”; it is not prose but the 
“prosaic” as it irrupts within verse; its “sounding” cannot be extracted 
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from its prosodic e+ect within the verse structure of the hymn as a 
whole. Such moments show Heidegger in a far more ambivalent rela-
tionship with poetics and criticism than we might suspect. Secondly, 
the “sounding” of the word would collapse the distinction between 
linguistic meaning on the one hand and the sonority of language on the 
other. The “sounding” of Hölderlin’s poem concerns the meaning of an 
individual word, denn, but is not thereby simply a figure for semantic 
(or “aletheic,” even) clarity. For this meaning is generated prosodically, 
as the incursion of “prosaic” dissonance into “jingling” singsong. It is 
only when we experience this word “as prose” (which, were it embedded 
in prose, we would not do) that we can hear its “sounding.” Heidegger’s 
invocation of sounding thus brings us to the very core of his think-
ing on language. In this paper I wish to approach these two questions 
alongside one another, and argue that “sounding” is crucial to our un-
derstanding both of the truth-value of art and poetry – its capacity to 
bring a word to “sound, as though spoken for the first time” – and of 
the phrase “language speaks,” which will become a guideword to his 
thinking from 1950 onwards. 
I I
Heidegger’s thinking on the sounding of language is elaborated at 
greatest length in the notes to his 1939 lecture series on Herder’s On 
the Origins of Languages. The published version of the lecture series 
is made up for the most part of lecture notes, and constitutes less an 
overarching account of language than a thinking through of some of 
his most abiding concerns. Precisely for this reason it provides an illu-
minating depiction of Heidegger attempting to confront these concerns 
at a moment when his thought was in flux. Throughout these notes he 
returns to Herder’s claim that the sounds of language are heard not 
in the ear but the “soul,” and which he takes to mean that, instead of 
sounds being “added to meaning, rather the meaning sounds” (GA 85: 
111/94). This is precisely what he was getting at in his analysis of the 
word denn in “Germanien”: the meaning is not a pre-existing semantic 
content transmitted through a physical token, rather it is through its 
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sounding that it becomes meaningful. Sounding – and, by consequence, 
linguistic meaning – would in this respect be anterior to any opposition 
between ideality and materiality. 
 This consideration develops Being and Time’s central claim that 
“Dasein hears because it understands” (GA 2: 217/SZ1: 163); however, it 
also o+ers an advance on this early account of language. In Being and 
Time Heidegger is arguing that all sensory receptivity to language is 
grounded on the discoveredness of Dasein. When he turns to language’s 
sounding, the phenomenal heft of the word has become part of what 
first engenders this discoveredness. However, for this to be the case, 
Heidegger is at pains to distinguish the “sounding” of language that 
“means” and “lets appear” from the sonority of the word as verbal 
icon, Wortlaut (word-sound) or Lautgebilde (the word’s “sound-form”). 
Heidegger argues that in the Wortlaut, the sounding itself has been 
abstracted (or, in Heidegger’s more extreme, and, given the political 
context of 1939, troubling terminology, “degenerated”) into a “present-
at-hand” sensuous token whose function is to transmit the meaning of 
a referential sign (GA 85: 34/38). The sounding of language only be-
comes mere “sound” when its referential function has been taken to be 
linguistic meaning in its entirety, with sound itself reduced to a bodily 
husk. This anticipates his observation, in “The Nature of Language” 
almost two decades later, that on the referential model it is unlikely 
“the physical element of language, its vocal and written character, is 
being adequately experienced,” nor that “it is su)cient to associate 
sound exclusively with the body understood in physiological terms, and 
to place it within the metaphysically conceived confines of the sensu-
ous” (GA 12: 193/98). 
 I will return to the question of the body below. Before that, I wish 
to dwell on the other detail of the “sounding” of this word denn in 
the opening lines of “Germanien”: that it “sounds as though spoken for 
the first time.” The motif “for the first time” recurs throughout “The 
Origin of the Work of Art” (written between the “Germanien” lectures 
and the lecture series on Herder), as a trope for the artwork’s aletheic ca-
pacity, whereby it “sets up a world.” This happens first at the level of the 
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art medium – “The rock comes to bear and to rest and so first becomes 
rock; the metal comes to glimmer and shimmer, the colours to shine, 
the sounds to ring, the word to say” (GA 5: 32/24) – but subsequently in-
flects the surrounding world: the temple at Paestum, for instance, “first 
makes the storm visible in its violence,” “first brings forth the light of 
day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of night,” so that “Tree, grass, 
eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter their distinctive shapes 
and thus come to appearance as what they are” (GA 5: 28/21). In other 
words, the artwork transforms the ways in which we encounter beings 
in an open region, and this is experienced as our seeing them “for the 
first time,” just as the poem brings us to encounter the word denn dif-
ferently than we had done so before. And indeed, this is precisely how, 
in the Herder lectures, sounding is conceived: “‘sounding’ is at first a 
self-showing as a being, an appearing, that lets appear” (GA 85: 111/96). 
The sounding of language both announces its own entry into appear-
ance (as self-showing), and permits other beings to show themselves. 
 In this, Heidegger is not simply following the argumentation of 
“Origin,” however. As a “letting-appear,” we encounter the basis of 
something like linguistic reference. Heidegger, that is, is anticipating 
that programmatic claim of his later writing on language that the es-
sence of language is “saying as showing” (GA 12: 242/123). Indeed, he 
goes on to characterise λόγος itself as a “gathering sounding” (sam-
melndes Lauten) (GA 85: 35/29), the articulation of beings in openness 
that language e+ects coincides with its own appearance in this open.
 This description of λόγος as a “gathering sounding” will strike us 
at first as rather unexpected, given that in both Being and Time and 
On the Way to Language authentic λόγος is depicted as silent. Yet the 
gerundive Lauten implies a process of movement into sound from out of 
an anterior silence. Here we see its sounding coincide with Heidegger’s 
explanation, in “Origin,” for how the artwork can engender this “first” 
quality. For Heidegger tells us that sounding is the “happening of the 
strife of earth and world” (GA 85: 54/45, emphases in original), and in 
this it is “not essentially related to the tone and sound, but to the open-
ness and clearing of being and, that is, to the silence and the rending of 
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the silence in the strife of world and earth” (GA 85: 125/107). If we are 
to understand both how language comes to sound, and what kind of 
meaning this sounding might furnish, we should look in greater detail 
at its “strife”-character. It is to this question that I now turn.
I I I
In the “Origin of the Work of Art,” “earth,” whilst most readily en-
countered as a brute thingliness, is defined ostensibly by its movement 
of “coming-forth concealing” (GA 5: 32/24). Heidegger depicts a strug-
gle in which the earth, “bearing and rising up, strives to preserve its 
closedness” (GA 5: 51/38), but is captured and traced within the world 
from which it would withdraw. The strife would be “silent” insofar as 
it withdraws from worldly experience; it would emerge into “sounding” 
as it is captured and traced momentarily within the world. Heidegger 
situates the “earth” in the artwork’s “work-material” or medium, but to 
do so poses a particular problem when it comes to poetry. Whereas this 
work-material is easy enough to identify elsewhere – the “bearing and 
resting” of stone, the “shining” of colour, and the “ringing” of sound – 
it is not certain what poetry’s work-material would be. Heidegger calls 
the “earth” of language “the naming power of the word” (GA 5: 32/24), 
but where this “power” resides, and what is “earthy” about it, are not 
entirely clear. One influential and powerful reading speaks of the 
“opacity of verbal matter”: “The sounds of spoken language, its rhythm, 
its accents, its timbre, its resonance, its pace, as well as its written char-
acters,” which “through their material weight … escape signification 
and withdraw from the clarity of sense and from the transparency of 
the world.”1 But there is a danger in this gloss: to “escape signification” 
will not in and of itself entail a withdrawal from sense and world, es-
pecially given Heidegger’s attempt to dispute the model of language as 
signification with an arbitrary sonorous token. Moreover, it cannot be 
grasped simply in its “sounds,” insofar as the earth withdraws from all 
phenomenality – sound, after all, remains audible. Whatever sonority 
the earth might have will be far more complex to situate.
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 In light of this di)culty, I would like to focus on the “strife” itself. 
If “sounding” has a “strife-character,” this would mean that the very 
movement of language into sounding strives against (or rends, reisst) 
the silencing movement that bounds it. But insofar as it is in “strife,” 
it does enter sounding. Perhaps we might think of earth as something 
like an open E-string played on the violin: at once pitch, timbre, and 
the oscillations of the string reverberating on the soundboard, but at the 
same time the scraping of horsehair on catgut. As anyone acquainted 
with this sound (especially when it is generated by a five-year-old) will 
know, the moment that is most violent on the ear is also the moment 
closest to silence, as the bow almost scratches to a halt on the string (and 
so the vibrations cease). This would also explain why the word denn 
in “Germanien” “sounds” through its prosodic dissonance, as this is 
where we most powerfully experience the excess and breakdown of our 
sonorous experience – and experience this excess, this breakdown, as 
sonority. It is in its excess over simple audibility, then, in an excess expe-
rienced at the limits of audibility, that Heidegger can describe Wortlaut 
as the “preserving keeping – earth of the world” (GA 85: 109/93). In the 
“sounding” of language, earth enters the phenomenal world in such 
a way as to become audible, but dissonantly and aporetically, and so 
inhabits the Wortlaut even as the Wortlaut would blot it out. 
IV
It is in this regard that we can understand another of the key phrases 
of Heidegger’s late writings on language, one which obtains its first 
formulations in the Herder lectures: the “peal ? of stillness [Geläut ? 
der Stille]” (GA 85: 90/78). In the 1939 lectures, there is an arrow point-
ing upwards after “peal,” indicating non-verbally the movement of this 
peal into sounding, embodying the “coming-forth” of the earth into 
phenomenal experience. Whilst the arrow was subsequently dropped, 
its directional thrust strikes me as illuminating for understanding what 
is meant by his saying that “language speaks as the peal of stillness.” 
With this phrase, his concern is double: first, he wishes to characterize 
the way a “silent” language anterior to reference can be experienced; 
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second, he wishes to grasp the movement by which this originary lan-
guage enters verbal articulation. In both instances, the way we con-
ceive of verbal sound is crucial, as this becomes the mode by which this 
“peal” is experienced. In “The Way to Language,” which marks the 
culmination of his thinking of the period, and perhaps the most suc-
cinct statement on language he makes, he sums it up thusly:
The phonetic-acoustic-physiological explanation of 
sounding does not experience their origin in the peal of 
stillness, even less so how sounding is thereby brought 
to voice and determined [die hierdurch erbrachte  
Be-stimmung des Lautens]. (GA 12: 241/121–22, tm)
There are two striking things about this passage; firstly, we can note 
how, through his insertion of a hyphen into Bestimmung, he wishes 
to suggest that the determination of verbal language takes place as a 
bringing-to-voice. This means that the fixing of the word’s semantic 
meaning is inextricably bound up with the human body. Indeed, Hei-
degger links the “phonetic” explanation of verbal sound as a sensuous 
token with the “physiological” explanation of sound production through 
the vocal cords. Secondly, this “bringing to voice” is concerned with the 
movement into language of two stillnesses, which would both come to 
sound in this “peal”: the silence of a “linguistic essence” beyond all 
human activity, and therefore beyond the limits of the audible, and a 
silence that stems from the opacity of the human body itself.
 The first of these two silences is probed in the 1950 lecture “Lan-
guage,” a reading of Trakl’s “Ein Winterabend.” Here he argues that 
silence, Stille (also translated as “stillness”), is by no means the “sound-
less” (Lautlos), that is, the absence of sound, but lies anterior to any 
sound-soundless opposition (GA 12: 26/PLT 204). This echoes his simi-
lar claim, in “Origin,” that the artwork’s “rest” (Ruhe) is not the lack 
of motion but rather the highest form of movedness (Bewegtheit) which 
furnishes motion as such. Indeed, the German Stille incorporates both 
silence and stillness, allowing Heidegger to depict the “sounding” of 
language as a form of movement into appearance. The “Saying” which 
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e+ects such motion would be silent/still both by virtue of lying anterior 
to verbal language and by virtue of its excess over verbal language. 
When we hear a “peal” of stillness, what we are hearing in part is this 
excess from within the framework that is being exceeded.
 The “peal of stillness” is not only the point where silence and 
sounding, stillness and movement, intersect. It is also the point of con-
tact between language’s “linguistic essence” and human speech: the 
“peal of stillness is nothing human” (GA 12: 27/PLT 205), and yet it 
peals within human speech. This means that the “peal of stillness,” 
when it sounds, is necessarily distorted: coming to sound, Heidegger 
says, “be it speech or writing, the silence is broken” (GA 12: 28/PLT 
206). Arising from out of this silence, the sounding of language loses 
the silence that is its source; drawn into presence, it has been torn from 
the withdrawing movement proper to it. And yet, as Chris Fynsk has 
noted, insofar as language “needs” human speech, the breaking of its 
silence in fact becomes a condition for this silence. Not only, then, does 
its silence speak through, and as, “noise”; such “noise” becomes an in-
tegral feature to the silence of “linguistic essence” itself.2 
V
Here, the “silence” that peals in human speech is aligned with an 
originary λόγος. In the 1957–8 lectures on “The Nature of Language,” 
however, Heidegger identifies a second silence out of which language 
“sounds.” Here, Heidegger takes issue with the notion that language 
is merely reference, and points to “the property of language to sound 
and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble” as evidence that verbal 
sound is more than simply the arbitrary husk of the signifier. As in the 
1939 Herder lectures, he appeals to the “earth” as the provenance of 
such sounding, ringing, and vibrating: “body and mouth are part of the 
earth’s flow and growth in which we mortals flourish” (GA 12: 194/98). 
By this juncture in Heidegger’s thought, “earth” is no longer being 
conceived as in “strife” with “world,” but rather one of the “fourfold” 
that makes up the world. It is in opposition with “sky” or “heaven” 
(Himmel), whilst on a second axis, divinities are opposed to mortals. 
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This has a subtle shift of emphasis: whilst still characterised by its 
coming-forth concealing movement, earth is now thematized much 
more in terms of what is “sheltered” by it and “emerges” from out of it. 
To see how precisely “earth’s flow and growth” becomes at once bodily 
and linguistic, Heidegger calls upon some passages from Hölderlin, no-
tably the description of language as “the mouth’s flower.” This phrase, 
Heidegger continues, lets us “hear” 
the sound of language rising up earthwise. From 
whence? From a saying in which happens the letting-
appear of world. The sound rings out in the resounding 
assembly call which, open to the open, lets world appear 
in things. . . . The sounding, the earthly of language 
is held with the harmony [Stimmen] that, playing to-
gether in chorus the regions of the world’s structure, 
attunes them towards one another [einstimmt]. (GA 12: 
196/101, tm)
This “sounding” arises both out of the “earth” of the flowering mouth 
and throat, and out of the “saying” which first brings world to appear. 
In this respect, the “sounding of language” is something like the point 
of intersection of both movements – of saying into speech and of the 
earth of the body into a language that rings, vibrates, hovers, and trem-
bles. Yet Heidegger is in fact making a far stronger claim: that these 
two constitute not only one and the same peal, but one and the same 
movement. The earth of the body engenders the “open” space in which 
we encounter ourselves and the world around us; at the same time, “say-
ing” o+ers a “harmony” that attunes beings towards one another, thus 
setting them into relation and holding them within the world. We en-
counter an articulation at once bodily and linguistic, whose “sounding” 
arises out of the “earth” of this body, and even, as “sounding,” preserves 
this earth in momentary presence. All sounding becomes Be-stimmung: 
a bringing to voice which fixes language in presence.
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VI
I would like to finish by treating briefly two final points. Firstly, this ac-
count of language’s sounding movement entails a striking transforma-
tion in the category of voice. And indeed, placing the shared origin of 
body and language in the voice, Heidegger seems to be committing the 
most egregious “phonocentrism.” This charge, however, would be pre-
cipitate. Heidegger’s conception of “sounding” aims to think the bodily 
in language far beyond any simplistic privileging of speech over writ-
ing, as evidenced by the marginal notes he adds to the 1960 editions of 
“Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Way of Language”: “Language 
and Body (Sound and Script),” and “Sounding and Bodying – Body 
and Script” (GA 5: 62/47; GA 12: 249), and in his apparent indi+erence 
in the “Ein Winterabend” lecture, cited above, as to whether human 
language is in “speech or writing.” 
 Yet Heidegger’s thinking at this juncture also o+ers a significant 
advance over (I’m tempted to say, it “supplements”) deconstructive 
philosophy. At the crux of Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism is the 
claim that Husserl attempts to secure the absolute presence of voice 
to the speaking subject through the motif of “hearing-oneself-speak,” 
but cannot because voice itself is ultimately inflected with irreduc-
ible di+erence.3 When Heidegger portrays language’s sounding as the 
“earthwise” “rising up” of voice in throat, then voice withdraws from 
the very articulation it renders possible. The body becomes the site for 
language only as it becomes opaque to it – becomes, indeed, opaque to 
itself. The intersection of language and body happens, in other words, 
at the breakdown of bodily self-presence, which is at the same time the 
breakdown of a transparent λόγος. What is at issue in this silence is 
precisely how the human body itself, far from securing self-presence, 
becomes the site of an opacity that shapes our experience of presence 
as such and endows the limits of presence with an aporetic phenom-
enal weight. Heidegger depicts language’s originary articulation as 
a “soundless calling gathering” (lautlos rufende Versammeln) (GA 12: 
204/108); its binding power, and its capacity, in “calling,” to engage 
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with absence, are such that they exceed our experience of the phenom-
enality of language.
 Secondly, and finally, I would like to return to the question of poetry 
with which I started. Heidegger’s account of the sounding of language 
comes through a gloss of two moments in Hölderlin: “words, like flow-
ers,” and “the mouth’s flower.” This moment is perhaps most famous 
for the denunciation of metaphor that follows his employment of these 
phrases, which is one further instance of his disputing a “literary” 
interpretation of poetry in favour of attending to its significance for the 
thinking of being. At the same time, and inversely, we can regret the 
fact that, if Heidegger situates the voice’s “rising up” in these lines, he 
does not attend to their vocal qualities, even though he suggests that, in 
order to grasp language anterior to the scission of sound and sense, we 
should attend to “melody and rhythm in language,” and to “the kinship 
between song and speech.” Indeed, if the very notion of “sounding” is 
meant to antecede the sound-sense split, then for Heidegger to focus 
entirely on the “content” of the phrases (metaphors or similes or no) is 
somewhat problematic. 
 In this regard, the first instance I cited, from the lecture series 
on “Germanien,” appears more successful, as the word’s “sounding” 
concerns the meaning of an individual word and yet surfaces out of a 
prosodic dissonance. But here we find another problem, which is less 
one of Heidegger’s reading practice and more one of how we might 
reconcile this notion of “sounding” with poetic technique more gen-
erally. The prosodic dissonance that e+ects the poem’s “sounding” is 
itself engendered by a patterning of Wortlaut. In this case, it would 
seem that Wortlaut, a derivative form of sounding, is nevertheless that 
which makes such sounding possible. Or, to see it another way, we could 
say that Heidegger’s concern is with how an anterior truth of language 
– its gathering of beings into an open region in which they can be 
articulated verbally – can surface in the words we use, and how we can 
use words so that they exceed the framework we have at our disposal 
in order to grasp a linguistic essence that exceeds our linguistic us-
age and withdraws from it, and yet conditions it. To this end, poetry 
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would employ language as a medium whose possibilities – tropological, 
gestural, prosodic, and so forth – would a+ord us an encounter with 
this excess. This would be why it is in poetry, Heidegger says, that we 
hear the “broken silence” that “shapes the mortal speech that sounds 
in verses and sentences” (GA 12: 28/PLT 206), because poetry attends 
to the limits of the modes and media of its own sounding, and thereby 
probes the moments at which this “broken silence” shapes the poem’s 
speech. To think in greater detail the relation between Heidegger and 
poetics as a discipline, I would suggest that the question of how po-
etry’s engagement with its verbal medium might render audible a prior 
sounding o+ers a productive starting point.
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